@article {Eliasmith:1 March 2002:0952-813X:1,
	author = "Eliasmith C.",
	title = "The myth of the Turing machine: the failings of functionalism and related theses",
	journal = "Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence",
	volume = "14",
	year = "1 March 2002",
	abstract = "The properties of Turing's famous 'universal machine' has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. This paper shows that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing's powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, it is further argued that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, it is shown that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation from function make multiple realizability claims untestable and uninformative. As a result, it is concluded that the role of Turing machines in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered.",
	pages = "1-8(8)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/teta/2002/00000014/00000001/art00001"
}