@article {D'Oro:01Oct2005:0020-174X:395,
	author = "D'Oro, Giuseppina",
	title = "Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind1",
	journal = "Inquiry",
	volume = "48",
	year = "01Oct2005",
	abstract = "This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda.",
	pages = "395-412(18)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/sinq/2005/00000048/00000005/art00001"
	doi = "doi:10.1080/00201740500241847"
}