@article {Jonathan:December 2004:0951-5089:471,
	author = "Jonathan Cohen",
	title = "Objects, places, and perception",
	journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
	volume = "17",
	year = "December 2004",
	abstract = "In Clark (2000) , Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another crucial representational ingredient: it must also involve the representation of "sensory individuals" that exemplify sensorily extracted features. Moreover, he contends, the best way of understanding sensory individuals takes them to be places in space surrounding the perceiver. In this paper, I'll agree with Clark's case for sensory individuals (§1). However, I shall argue against his view of sensory individuals as places (§2). Instead, I'll propose and defend an alternative account of sensory individuals that construes the latter as (visual) objects (§§3-5).",
	pages = "471-495(25)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2004/00000017/00000004/art00002"
	doi = "doi:10.1080/0951508042000304180"
}