@article {Lawlor:December 2003:0951-5089:549,
	author = "Lawlor K.",
	title = "Elusive reasons: a problem for first-person authority",
	journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
	volume = "16",
	year = "December 2003",
	abstract = "Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, but one's self- ascriptions may lack authority. I present this new challenge from social psychology and use it to argue that first-person authority is agential authority: one's self-ascriptions are authoritative, in part anyway, because they are reliable expressions of those attitudes that govern further choices and behavior.",
	pages = "549-564(16)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2003/00000016/00000004/art00005"
	doi = "doi:10.1080/0951508032000166969"
}