@article {Mandik:1 March 1999:0951-5089:47,
	author = "Mandik P.",
	title = "Qualia, Space, and Control",
	journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
	volume = "12",
	year = "1 March 1999",
	abstract = "According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space.",
	pages = "47-60(14)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/1999/00000012/00000001/art00003"
}