@article {MacKenzie:November 2008:0955-2367:245,
	author = "MacKenzie, Matthew",
	title = "Self-Awareness without a Self: Buddhism and the Reflexivity of Awareness",
	journal = "Asian Philosophy",
	volume = "18",
	year = "November 2008",
	abstract = "In this paper, I show that a robust, reflexivist account of self-awareness (such as was defended by Dignaga and Dharmakīrti, most phenomenologists, and others) is compatible with reductionist view of persons, and hence with a rejection of the existence of a substantial, separate self. My main focus is on the tension between Buddhist reflexivism and the central Buddhist doctrine of no-self. In the first section of the paper, I give a brief sketch of reflexivist accounts of self-awareness, using the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti as my example. In the next section, I examine reductionism as it relates to accounts of the self. I then, in the third section, argue that a reductionist account of persons can account for the unique features of first-person contents and our deep and multi-layered sense of self.",
	pages = "245-266(22)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/casp/2008/00000018/00000003/art00004"
	doi = "doi:10.1080/09552360802440025"
}