@article {Pelling:May 2007:0031-8116:211,
	author = "Pelling, Charlie",
	title = "Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability",
	journal = "Philosophical Studies",
	volume = "134",
	year = "May 2007",
	abstract = "In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have adopted in response to the familiar `fineness of grain' objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call <I>the indiscriminability claim </I>seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and <I>the non-transitivity claim </I>-the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive -entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call <I>the problematic claim</I>. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option.",
	pages = "211-234(24)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000134/00000002/00005338"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11098-005-5338-y"
}