@article {Wilson:October 2006:0031-8116:61,
	author = "Wilson, Jessica",
	title = "On characterizing the physical",
	journal = "Philosophical Studies",
	volume = "131",
	year = "October 2006",
	abstract = "How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components,<SUP>1</SUP> <P></P>1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that<P></P>2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality).<P></P>Here I will explore the extent to which appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (no fundamental mentality) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. I will motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components.",
	pages = "61-99(39)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2006/00000131/00000001/00005984"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11098-006-5984-8"
}