@article {Bontly:May 2002:0031-8116:75,
	author = "Bontly T.D.",
	title = "The Supervenience Argument Generalizes",
	journal = "Philosophical Studies",
	volume = "109",
	year = "May 2002",
	abstract = "<P>In his recent book, Jaegwon Kim argues that psychophysical supervenience without psychophysical reduction renders mental causation `unintelligible'. He also claims that, contrary to popular opinion, his argument against supervenient mental causation cannot be generalized so as to threaten the causal efficacy of other `higher-level' properties: e.g., the properties of special sciences like biology. In this paper, I argue that none of the considerations Kim advances are sufficient to keep the supervenience argument from generalizing to all higher-level properties, and that Kim's position in fact entails that only the properties of fundamental physical particles are causally efficacious.</P>",
	pages = "75-96(20)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2002/00000109/00000001/00399499"
}