@article {Bostrom:May 2006:0924-6495:185,
	author = "Bostrom, Nick",
	title = "Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness",
	journal = "Minds and Machines",
	volume = "16",
	year = "May 2006",
	abstract = "If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers' “Fading Qualia” thought experiment.",
	pages = "185-200(16)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2006/00000016/00000002/00009036"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11023-006-9036-0"
}