@article {Collins:February 2005:0924-6495:1,
	author = "Collins, J.",
	title = "On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity",
	journal = "Minds and Machines",
	volume = "15",
	year = "February 2005",
	abstract = "Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis &#150; the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., <I>modules</I> &#150; is <I>a priori</I> incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the &#145;input problem&#146;: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such <I>a priori</I> problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a &#145;really real&#146; input problem (i.e., an empirical one). It will be suggested that this problem is real enough, but it does not selectively strike down massive modularity &#150; it is a problem for everyone.",
	pages = "1-22(22)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2005/00000015/00000001/00001346"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11023-004-1346-5"
}