@article {Rapaport:February 2002:0924-6495:3, author = "Rapaport W.J.", title = "Holism, Conceptual-Role Semantics, and Syntactic Semantics", journal = "Minds and Machines", volume = "12", year = "February 2002", abstract = "

This essay continues my investigation of `syntactic semantics': the theory that, pace Searle's Chinese-Room Argument, syntax does suffice for semantics (in particular, for the semantics needed for a computational cognitive theory of natural-language understanding). Here, I argue that syntactic semantics (which is internal and first-person) is what has been called a conceptual-role semantics: The meaning of any expression is the role that it plays in the complete system of expressions. Such a `narrow', conceptual-role semantics is the appropriate sort of semantics to account (from an `internal', or first-person perspective) for how a cognitive agent understands language. Some have argued for the primacy of external, or `wide', semantics, while others have argued for a two-factor analysis. But, although two factors can be specified–-one internal and first-person, the other only specifiable in an external, third-person way–-only the internal, first-person one is needed for understanding how someone understands. A truth-conditional semantics can still be provided, but only from a third-person perspective.

", pages = "3-59(57)", url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2002/00000012/00000001/00389767" }