@article {Knowles:August 2001:0924-6495:347,
	author = "Knowles J.",
	title = "Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science?",
	journal = "Minds and Machines",
	volume = "11",
	year = "August 2001",
	abstract = "<P>I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments for the idea that intentional psychological states, such as beliefs, must be seen as requiring in-the-head mental representations for us to be able to understand their characteristic causal powers and argue that none of them validly generate their desired conclusions. I go on to argue that RTM, or some computational version thereof, is not motivated by appeal to the nature of cognitive science research either. I conclude that intentional psychology, though an empirical theory, is autonomous from details of lower level mechanism in a way that renders RTM unwarranted.</P>",
	pages = "347-377(31)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2001/00000011/00000003/00281197"
}