@article {Parkhurst:June 2004:1386-4157:141,
	author = "Parkhurst G.M.",
	author = "Shogren J.F.",
	author = "Bastian C.",
	title = "Repetition, Communication, and Coordination Failure",
	journal = "Experimental Economics",
	volume = "7",
	year = "June 2004",
	abstract = "We examine repetition as an institution that affects coordination failure in a game with and without pre-play communication. We use probit regression with random effects to test hypotheses regarding the frequency and form of coordination failure in the presence of repeated play versus one-shot games. Our results indicate that repetition without pre-play communication results in a lower frequency of coordination failure relative to one-shot game outcomes. This result is reversed when pre-play communication is allowed. Our evidence also suggests that repeated play coordination failures tend to be suboptimal Nash equilibria, whereas one-shot game coordination failures are disequilibria regardless of the presence of pre-play communication.",
	pages = "141-152(12)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/exec/2004/00000007/00000002/05273625"
	doi = "doi:10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026976.44467.66"
}