@article {Egan:January 2006:0031-8205:97,
	author = "Egan, Andy",
	title = "Secondary Qualities and Self-Location",
	journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
	volume = "72",
	year = "January 2006",
	abstract = "There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer-independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less-than-fully-real, subjective, observer-dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction <I>the primary/secondary quality distinction</I>. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling-out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.",
	pages = "97-119(23)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2006/00000072/00000001/art00004"
}