@article {Botterell:2001:1355-8250:21,
	author = "Botterell A.",
	title = "Conceiving what is not there",
	journal = "Journal of Consciousness Studies",
	volume = "8",
	year = "2001",
	abstract = "<P>In this paper I argue that certain so-called conceivability arguments fail to show that a currently popular version of physicalism in the philosophy of mind is false. Concentrating on an argument due to David Chalmers, I first argue that Chalmers misrepresents the relation between conceivability and possibility. I then argue that the intuition behind the conceivability of so-called zombie worlds can be accounted for without having to suppose that such worlds are genuinely conceivable. I conclude with some general remarks about the nature of conceivability.</P>",
	pages = "21-42(22)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/00000008/1225"
}