@article {Lewis:1998:1355-8250:59,
	author = "Lewis H.A.",
	title = "Consciousness: inexplicable -- and useless too?",
	journal = "Journal of Consciousness Studies",
	volume = "5",
	year = "1998",
	abstract = "<P>The problem of consciousness arises when we accept that humans are subject to conscious experiences, and that these experiences resist explanations of a kind that other puzzling phenomena permit. I first consider the case that such experiences exist and then the reasons for taking a pessimistic view of our chances of explaining them. I argue that the fact that conscious experience is ineffable makes the problem even harder than Chalmers allows, as it undermines a presentation of the problem of reductive explanation in this case. The fact that conscious phenomena require a first-person perspective provides a further reason for taking a pessimistic view of the chances for the kind of theory that Chalmers seeks. In a final section I consider what form solutions to the problem, as revised, might take.</P>",
	pages = "59-66(8)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1998/00000005/00000001/813"
}