@article {Libet:1996:1355-8250:33,
	author = "Libet B.",
	title = "Solutions to the hard problem of consciousness",
	journal = "Journal of Consciousness Studies",
	volume = "3",
	year = "1996",
	abstract = "<P>Solutions to the &#145;hard problem&#146; of consciousness must accept conscious experience as a fundamental non-reducible phenomenon in nature, as Chalmers suggests. Chalmers proposes candidates for an acceptable theory, but I find basic flaws in these. Our own experimental investigations of brain processes causally involved in the development of conscious experience appear to meet Chalmers&#146; requirement. Even more directly, I had previously proposed a hypothetical &#145;conscious mental field&#146; as an emergent property of appropriate neural activities, with the attributes of integrated subjective experience and a causal ability to modulate some neural processes. This theory meets all the requirements imposed by the &#145;hard problem&#146; and, significantly, it is experimentally testable.</P>",
	pages = "33-35(3)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1996/00000003/00000001/678"
}