@article {Hendel:September 2001:0034-0006:252,
	author = "Hendel G.",
	title = "Physicalism, Nothing Buttery, and Supervenience",
	journal = "Ratio",
	volume = "14",
	year = "September 2001",
	abstract = "<P>I consider the position (which I call&#145;the triad&#146;) according to which <I>physicalism</I> is a reductive claim which is capturable in terms of the idea (the &#145;<I>nothing buttery</I>&#146; idea) that there is nothing but/nothing over and above the physical, an idea which, in its turn, is meant to be capturable in terms of a determinate form of <I>supervenience</I>. (Physicalism is then meant to be capturable in terms of the form of supervenience in question.) I argue that there is a tension in the triad. The notion of &#145;nothing buttery&#146; required has features which can&#039;t be captured by the supervenience of the triad. Hence, one cannot have both physicalism as nothing-buttery-reductive and physicalism as supervenience of the kind in question. If one wants to hold onto the idea of physicalism as nothing-buttery-reductive, one must be prepared to identify physicalism with a much stronger claim than one might have originally thought, a claim that can&#039;t be captured by the supervenience of the triad.</P>",
	pages = "252-262(11)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2001/00000061/00000003/art00161"
}