@article {Martin:September 2002:0268-1064:376,
	author = "Martin, M.G.F.",
	title = "The Transparency of Experience",
	journal = "Mind & Language",
	volume = "17",
	year = "September 2002",
	abstract = "A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sensedatum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naïve realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense-datum theories.",
	pages = "376-425(50)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/00000004/art00002"
	doi = "doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00205"
}