@article {McCullagh:November 2000:0268-1064:481,
	author = "McCullagh, Mark",
	title = "Functionalism and Self-Consciousness",
	journal = "Mind & Language",
	volume = "15",
	year = "November 2000",
	abstract = "I offer a philosophically well-motivated work-around for a problem that George Bealer (`Self-consciousness', Philosophical Review v. 106, 1997) has identified, which he claims is fatal to functionalism. The problem concerns how to generate a satisfactory Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory in which mental predicates occur within the scopes of other mental predicates. My central claim is that the functional roles in terms of which a creature capable of self-consciousness identifies her own mental states must be roles that items could play within creatures whose psychology is less complex than her own.",
	pages = "481-499(19)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2000/00000015/00000005/art00002"
	doi = "doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00146"
}