@article {Aydede:September 1997:0268-1064:422,
	author = "Aydede M.",
	title = "Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?",
	journal = "Mind & Language",
	volume = "12",
	year = "September 1997",
	abstract = "<P>In <I>The Elm and the Expert</I> (1994), Fodor rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I show that there has been no change in Fodor's treatment of Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. I also critically reconstruct the evolution of Fodor's thinking between 1980 and 1994.</P>",
	pages = "422-458(37)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056"
}