@article {Wen:April 1996:0899-8256:286,
	author = "Wen Q.",
	title = "On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games",
	journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
	volume = "13",
	year = "April 1996",
	abstract = "<P> This paper studies renegotiation-proof equilibria of Benoit and Krishna (1993) in finitely repeated games with more than two players. We provide a simple characterization of the set of average payoffs from renegotiation-proof equilibria: the limiting set of average equilibrium payoffs is either efficient or dimensionally small as the horizon of the repeated game goes to infinity. Two sufficient conditions for the former to occur are provided. An example shows that those conditions cannot be weakened. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.</P>",
	pages = "286-300(15)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/ga/1996/00000013/00000002/art00038"
}